The Digitalization of Russian Politics and Political Participation by Wijermars, Mariëlle
15© The Author(s) 2021
D. Gritsenko et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Digital Russia 
Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42855-6_2
CHAPTER 2




Digitalization has affected politics in manifold ways, which result from the 
broad variety of technologies the term comprises. The Internet and, more 
recently, social media have, for instance, transformed political campaigning. 
The publication of public policy documents on government websites has cre-
ated new expectations for political transparency. And, the introduction of vot-
ing computers and other e-voting solutions has made it possible to fundamentally 
rethink the voting process (e.g. online voting) while raising novel security con-
cerns. In its strictest sense, digital politics can be defined as “how politicians 
employ the Internet to reach, court, and mobilize citizens and about how citi-
zens rely on the web to inform themselves and engage with others politically” 
(Vaccari 2013, 4). Yet, as is pointed out by Stephen Coleman and Deen 
Freelon, “[t]o speak of digital politics is not simply to tell a story about how 
political routines are replicated online,” rather it is about the (unforeseen) 
transformations of political practices that result from digitalization:
One feature of all technologies is that they are constitutive: they do not simply 
support predetermined courses of action, but open up new spaces of action, often 
contrary to the original intentions of inventors and sponsors. (Coleman and 
Freelon 2015, 1)
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In this chapter, I discuss the impact of digitalization on politics in Russia and 
the extent to which such unforeseen transformations in the political process 
have taken place. My discussion highlights four areas: political communication; 
political campaigning; voting; and, political participation and civic engagement.
While the digitalization of politics is a global trend, the characteristics and 
constraints of the national political context, such as the uptake speed of par-
ticular technologies, condition the shape digital politics takes. In the case of 
Russia, the proliferation of digital technologies unfolded in parallel with the 
“authoritarian turn” under President Vladimir Putin (Smyth 2016). As the 
examples discussed in this chapter will illustrate, digitalization has in fact been 
a deliberate politics on the part of the Russian state. While it is therefore neces-
sary to consider to what extent the impact of digital technologies on politics 
unfolds differently in democracies as compared to hybrid regimes or non- 
democracies, the opposite poles of the scholarly debate are similar: they either 
highlight the democratizing potential of digital tools or focus on their unin-
tended or negative consequences. Given the different starting points—for 
example, the extent to which the object of study can be classified as a function-
ing democracy—this nonetheless results in different questions being asked.
Regarding Western liberal democracies, the democratizing potential is 
thought to lie in the opportunities digitalization provides for remedying the 
democratic deficit, for example through increased citizen participation, more 
direct communication channels between politicians and citizens through social 
media and the facilitation of forms of direct democracy. On the flipside, con-
cerns have emerged about how online communications, in particular social 
media, may have polarizing effects that negatively affect societal stability and 
may be used to manipulate public opinion and election outcomes, as well as 
concerns about expanding state surveillance. In a similar vein, in the context of 
hybrid or non-democratic states, scholarly debate placed high hopes on the 
democratizing potential of the Internet. It was assumed that, among other fac-
tors, increased access to information online and the facilitation of political 
mobilization through the use of social media would empower citizens to chal-
lenge state power and demand a greater say in political decision-making (e.g. 
Castells 2012). Departing from the same assumption, many studies have exam-
ined states’ efforts to control online communications and protect the political 
status quo in response (e.g. Deibert et  al. 2010). The extent to which the 
Internet indeed functions as a “liberation technology” is increasingly ques-
tioned (e.g. Diamond 2010). Rather, it appears that the proliferation of 
Internet access has given rise to “networked authoritarianism” (MacKinnon 
2011, 33), a condition in which:
the single ruling party remains in control while a wide range of conversations 
about the country’s problems nonetheless occurs on websites and social- 
networking services. The government follows this online chatter, and sometimes 
people are able to use the Internet to call attention to social problems or injus-
tices and even manage to have an impact on government policies. As a result, the 
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average person with Internet or mobile access has a much greater sense of free-
dom—and may feel that he has the ability to speak and be heard—in ways that 
were not possible under classic authoritarianism. At the same time, in the net-
worked authoritarian state, there is no guarantee of individual rights and free-
doms. (MacKinnon 2011, 33)
Notwithstanding the challenges that online communications raise for main-
taining political control by increasing citizens’ access to information and 
opportunities for free speech, it appears many authoritarian states are disin-
clined to (fully) limit access to the Internet. The seeming paradox—often 
referred to as the digital “dictator’s dilemma”—may be explained by the poten-
tial economic consequences of such a decision, fear of popular unrest or the 
undermining a regime’s democratic image or other sources of regime legiti-
macy. Yet, scholars have also noted that digitalization may, in fact, strengthen 
rather than weaken authoritarian regimes since the Internet can be used to 
effectuate political control, and information and opinions shared by citizens 
online can be a valuable resource to gauge public opinion on policy issues (e.g. 
Gunitsky 2015).
In this chapter, I first examine how the activities of political actors in Russia 
have changed as a result of digitalization, focusing on political communication 
and election campaigning, before turning my attention towards changes in vot-
ing and other forms of political participation. Many of these changes result 
from or developed against the backdrop of the introduction of open govern-
ment ideas. Therefore, I open with an overview of actions in this domain. I 
argue that, while some of the changes described can be categorized as mere 
digital reproductions of existing political practices, several spheres of Russian 
politics have been transformed as a result of digitalization, in particular the 
opportunities for political opposition and civic engagement.
2.2  open Government
The concept of open government promotes the ideal of transparency and 
accountability in governance: citizens should be able to access governmental 
documents and proceedings in order to establish an effective climate of checks 
and balances. In the past two decades, the concept has been inseparably inter-
twined with the notion of “e-government”: the spread of Internet access and 
information technology (IT) infrastructures have made the Internet the perfect 
solution for achieving the aims of “open” government. Combined, the overall 
goals of open and e-government are to increase efficiency and transparency, as 
well as to simplify and improve the provision of governmental services to civil-
ians and government-to-citizen communication. In Russia, the government 
initiated the expansion of information technologies, digitization, provision of 
online services, increased governmental transparency and so forth in earnest in 
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the early 2000s (see also Chaps. 3 and 5). The Federal Program “Èlektronnaâ 
Rossiâ (2002–2010)” (Electronic Russia)
called for the ‘widespread integration’ of information technology in government 
operations for such tasks as document management, registrations and declara-
tions, and procurement tenders. To accomplish this mission, E-Russia’s goals also 
included building up the nation’s IT hardware and telecommunications infra-
structure and developing a supportive legal and regulatory environment. Of note, 
the program’s mission statement also called for ‘significantly increasing the vol-
ume of information [that] government institutions provide to citizens, including 
via the Internet,’ such as draft laws and decrees, government revenues, and bud-
gets; performance reports by public enterprises; and assessments by auditing 
agencies. In the process, information technologies were seen as ‘cardinally chang-
ing the basis of the government’s relationship with citizens and businesses’. 
(Peterson 2005, 51)
While some government bodies were early adopters, from 2003 onwards all 
federal agencies were required to make a broad range of information accessible 
online, such as regulations and legislation, and information on the activities of 
their officials (Peterson 2005, 58).
With modernization and innovation as the buzzwords to define his “lib-
eral” presidency, Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) launched a federal program 
aiming towards turning Russia into an “Information Society” (2011–2020) 
(Toepfl 2012, for more, see also Chap. 25) and a Minister of Open Government 
was appointed in 2012. In 2018, the ministerial position was discontinued, 
signaling the topic had lost priority with the authorities. The push towards 
open government has resulted in a significant increase in the availability of 
open government data. For example, information concerning government 
tenders can be accessed on the Goszakupki (Government procurement) por-
tal, zakupki.gov.ru, while various open data sources are collected on the open 
data portal data.gov.ru. Through the creation of dedicated online platforms, 
the transparency of the legislative process has been enhanced; for example, the 
video recording of the Russian State Duma can be viewed on the platform 
video.duma.gov.ru and draft laws are made available for public discussion on 
the platform regulation.gov.ru (for more, see also Chap. 5). Yet, many issues 
remain, including a tendency to reintroduce restrictions on publicly available 
information. For example, in response to investigations by Alexei Navalny’s 
FBK (Fond bor’by s korrupciej, Anti- Corruption Foundation), examples of 
which will be discussed below, the FSB (Federal’naâ služba bezopasnosti, 
Federal Security Service) proposed a law in 2015 that would severely restrict 
access to information about property ownership contained in Rosreestr 
(Federal Register). While the law was not passed, the Supreme Court deter-
mined in 2017 that Rosreestr is permitted to limit third-party access to owner-




2.3  polItIcal communIcatIon
Parallel to the emphasis on adopting digital technologies in the policy sphere, 
significant changes were implemented in the authorities’ communication strat-
egies that, to an extent, resemble trends in political communication elsewhere. 
As a public advocate for technological innovation, Medvedev can be credited 
with pushing forward both the open government agenda and expanding 
Russian political communication from traditional media to online platforms. 
Through videos posted on the Kremlin website and, from 2009 onwards, his 
blog on LiveJournal (at the time the most popular blogging platform, see 
Podshibyakin 2010), Medvedev set an example for novel ways of communicat-
ing and engaging with citizens, and he pushed other government officials to 
start blogging as well (Gorham 2014). In 2010, some 35 per cent of Russian 
regional governors had a blog, a third of which emulated the videoblog format 
exemplified by the president (Toepfl 2012).
Medvedev’s blogging activities were criticized for being “a blog without a 
blogger” (Yagodin 2012, 1422): his page featured videos posted by the presi-
dential administration and functioned rather as a one-way channel for commu-
nication, lacking signs of Medvedev’s direct contribution or his interaction 
with the online community, for example, with those commenting on his posts. 
Notwithstanding Medvedev’s initial statements about aspiring towards a form 
of direct democracy through digital means, in practice most Russian politicians 
used their online communications “in ways that minimize the perils of truly 
direct online interaction and opting, instead, for a more hierarchical model of 
communication grounded in the discourse of ‘e-government’” (Gorham 2014, 
235). Rather than entering into conversations with engaged citizens, the online 
communication strategies they chose opted for “the carefully structured, moni-
tored, and filtered interfaces such as the online opinion polling, ‘online recep-
tion area,’ or the sound-bite sized Twitter scroll” (Gorham 2014, 246). In a 
similar vein, Florian Toepfl (2012, 1454) argues that, when it concerns the 
leaders of Russia’s federal subjects, “most Russian governors did not set up 
their blog primarily with the intention of gaining electoral support.” Instead, 
blogging was predominantly “a symbolic action that showcased their allegiance 
and loyalty to the president, who was widely known for his Internet enthusi-
asm” (Toepfl 2012, 1454).
In his capacity as prime minister, following Vladimir Putin’s return to the 
presidential office in 2012, Medvedev moved his most visible online presence 
to Twitter and Instagram, following the shifts in the platforms’ popularity. 
Compared to his earlier presence on LiveJournal, the Instagram account is 
administered as a personal account, alternating between press photographs and 
pictures taken by Medvedev himself, accompanied with brief captions. Contrary 
to the LiveJournal blog, there is some interaction between the prime minister’s 
account and other users on the platform, with Medvedev now and then com-
menting and responding. The increased personal dimension of Medvedev’s 
social media presence may be explained by changing public relations (PR) 
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needs—aimed to remedy the previous lack of connection with citizens and fol-
lowing the more general trend of increased personalization of politics. The fact 
that Instagram is predominantly image-based—Medvedev is known to have an 
interest in photography—and allows one to post, edit and comment quickly 
through the application on one’s smartphone may also have been factors.
Yet, the decision to switch to Instagram also created vulnerabilities. Indeed, 
it was Medvedev’s Instagram that provided opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s 
Anti-Corruption Foundation with crucial visual evidence to tie together vari-
ous publicly available sources of information indicating the prime minister’s 
involvement in large-scale corruption (including hacked emails leaked by 
Russian hacker collective Šaltaj Boltaj [Humpty Dumpty], Global Positioning 
System [GPS] tracking of naval movements and various official registries). The 
results of the investigation were published in a video entitled “On vam ne 
Dimon” (“He is not Dimon to you”) shared through FBK’s YouTube channel 
and website. While this was not the first video FBK published that exposes cor-
rupt practices by Russian state officials—indeed, there are many—the Dimon 
video gained particular traction online (by December 2019: 32.8 million 
views). More importantly, it served as the occasion for mass anti-corruption 
protests on March 26, 2017, that mobilized thousands of protesters across 
Russia1; the largest demonstrations to take place since the protest movement of 
2011–2012. FBK’s investigations demonstrate how open source data—some 
of which became available as part of the implementation of open government 
ideas—can be effectively used to scrutinize and challenge government practices.
On the sub-federal level, Ramzan Kadyrov, the head of the Republic of 
Chechnya, is one of the Russian political actors who has most successfully used 
social media to increase his popularity, both in Chechnya and (far) beyond. His 
Instagram account, with posts that blended “discussion of politics with photos 
of himself hugging cats, posing in a knight’s outfit, working out in a gym, and 
throwing snowballs with friends” (Rodina and Dligach 2019, 95) collected 
some three million followers, before the platform decided to shut down his 
account. Kadyrov’s posts merged public, political and private spheres to the 
extent that “all of the personal topics contain elements of political framing, and 
most of the public/political topics include terminology that refers to personal 
topics such as friendship and family” (Rodina and Dligach 2019, 106). 
Kadyrov’s success exemplifies how social media “can be used to normalize des-
potism, giving a modern-day dictator ‘a human face’” (Rodina and Dligach 
2019, 96). The increasing use of social media in political communication is 
visibly changing the communication strategies used by the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as well, whose official Twitter account incorporates vernacular 
language and actively partakes in online debates (Zvereva 2020). The Ministry’s 
spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, in particular, has adopted a style of communi-
cation that blends formal and informal statements, expressed through multiple 
(and at times parallel) accounts on, for example, Facebook and Twitter.
Digitalization has also changed the rules of the game when it comes to 
political contestation by citizens. The rise of the Russian “blogosphere” and, 
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subsequently, the popularity of bloggers, citizen journalists and vloggers on 
social media and YouTube, brought about novel opportunities for sharing 
political criticism with a wide audience, and for creating communities around a 
political cause (of which Navalny is but one example). Over time, the Russian 
government has responded to this perceived threat in multiple ways. Most 
notably, with the so-called “Bloggers’ Law” (Federal Law No. 97-FZ) it intro-
duced a special register for bloggers with a daily audience of >3000 visitors in 
2014. For bloggers, some of whom published under a pseudonym, the regis-
tration involved, among other requirements, the disclosure of their real identi-
ties to the Russian authorities. The impact of the measure on the expression of 
political criticism online is difficult to ascertain, yet it is known that its intro-
duction did not lead to any blogs being blocked or fines imposed (Soldatov 
2019). Nonetheless, as Oleg Soldatov points out, “the mere existence of the 
public list of popular Internet personalities, administered by and conceived in 
the interests of a governmental body, should have led to a certain number of 
such personalities thinking twice before making public their criticism of the 
government” (Soldatov 2019, 70–71).
The law was repealed in 2017, which can be explained by a combination of 
factors: the ineffectiveness of the register and difficulties in enforcing the law 
(e.g. poor definition of who counts as a blogger, estimation of daily audience); 
a change of policy towards other control strategies (expanding restrictions on 
the publication of particular types of content); as well as the recognition that 
the practice of blogging was rapidly losing ground to other forms of online 
expression, most notably the shift to social media and video sharing platforms. 
Around the same time, the government attempted to co-opt some of these 
online “influencers.” Popular vlogger Sasha Spilberg was invited to address the 
State Duma in May 2017, and soon after a special “bloggers council”—in full, 
Sovet po razvitiû informacionnogo obsêstva i sredstv massovoj informacii (Council 
on the Development of Information Society and Mass Media)—was convened 
on the initiative of Vladimir Vlasov, the youngest member of parliament. The 
council got off to a bad start since only a third of the invited bloggers took 
part, and the most popular Russian vloggers publicly distanced themselves 
from the initiative, including oppositional vloggers such as Kamikadzedead 
(Makutina 2017). The council has since convened incidentally, yet appears to 
be of limited influence and predominantly speaks out in support of govern-
mental restrictions on online speech.
2.4  polItIcal campaIGnInG
Political campaigns in Russia tend to be candidate-centered, rather than focus-
ing on policy issues or political parties, a feature resulting from the constitu-
tionally strong president and other characteristics of the electoral system 
(Ishiyama 2019). As an “electoral authoritarian regime” (Gel’man 2015), elec-
tion outcomes in Russia are deemed important, even if the elections themselves 
are unfair. By extension, political campaigns are a significant feature of Russian 
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politics.2 As is noted by Sergei Samoilenko and Elina Erzikova, “[t]he tradi-
tional boundaries between news and political advertising have eroded in 
Russia” and unfair practices, such as “[h]idden advertising, black PR and biased 
news reporting” have been a common feature since the 1990s (2017, 265). 
Television and print media have played an important role in political campaign-
ing and media ownership is generally seen as an important factor in explaining 
election outcomes, most notably Boris Yeltsin’s victory in the 1996 presidential 
elections.3
The parliamentary elections of 2011 were the first in which the Internet 
played a role of significance in how election campaigns were run, resulting 
from both the increase of Internet access and the expansion of online party 
presence in the years preceding it (Roberts 2015; Samoilenko and Erzikova 
2017). While party websites appeared already at the time of the 1999 parlia-
mentary elections, by 2011 political campaigning via social networking sites 
had become a common feature. Edinaâ Rossiâ (United Russia), as the “party 
of power,” was particularly prolific and was active on multiple platforms in 
large measure because it had access to the resources needed to finance investing 
in the online dimension of its campaign. For example, the party’s Twitter 
account (er_2011) “issued an average of over 360 tweets per day during the 
intensive campaign period—more in a single day than the LDPR [Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia, led by conservative nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 
M.W.] and Yabloko [party of social-liberal orientation, M.W.] managed in the 
whole of the campaign, literally swamping the tweets from other parties,” while 
amassing 600 videos on its YouTube channel by December 2011 (Roberts 
2015, 1235).
On the candidate level, however, a different picture emerges. Analyzing the 
online campaigns of 910 candidates representing the seven political parties that 
were successfully registered for the elections, Sean Roberts found that only 111 
of them (12%) maintained either a website, a Twitter account or a LiveJournal 
blog, while this percentage was markedly higher among United Russia candi-
dates (43%) (Roberts 2015, 1236, 1238). However, a significant number of 
these accounts were dormant during the campaign period, suggesting “that 
United Russia candidates were being forced to use social networks by the party 
leadership making them at best reluctant web users, at worst ‘dissenters’ by 
deliberately failing to maintain their accounts” (Roberts 2015, 1245). 
Notwithstanding United Russia’s more extensive online activities, Roberts 
found “evidence of equalization [a relative leveling of the political playing field 
in favor of opposition parties, M.W.], as the online message of the remaining 
party candidates converged on an anti-United Russia theme” (Roberts 
2015, 1229).
The availability of resources appears to be a key determinant in whether a 
party decides to invest in developing online campaigning strategies. In this 
respect, a clear difference has emerged between the campaigning style of 
United Russia, whose “campaigns have become increasingly professionalized 
and digitized, with expansive media campaigns funded by administrative 
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resources” while its main competitor, the communist party KPRF 
(Kommunističeskaâ partiâ Rossijskoj Federacii, Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation), still “relies heavily on traditional methods of local party 
organization, voter mobilization (particularly older voters), newspaper adver-
tisements, short television spots, public appearances by Zyuganov and other 
KPRF leaders, and campaign flyers and posters” (Ishiyama 2019). Of the 
remaining parties represented in parliament, the LDPR operates more similar 
to United Russia, but without the same access to large budgets, while the cam-
paigning of Spravedlivaâ Rossiâ (A Just Russia) is more alike to the KPRF 
(Ishiyama 2019).
The significance of the availability of digital technologies appears to have 
been the greatest for opposition groups who are not represented in the Russian 
parliament (sometimes referred to as the “non-systemic” opposition) and who 
lack access to traditional media. A closer look at two campaigns run by Alexei 
Navalny—for the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections and 2018 presidential elec-
tions—demonstrates this well. As is argued by Renira Gambarato and Sergei 
Medvedev (2015), Navalny’s mayoral campaign (which build upon the 
2011–2012 protest movement; see Lonkila et al. 2020) introduced a new form 
of political campaigning in Russia that was more grassroots (e.g. through 
online fundraising) and characterized by the use of transmedia strategies.4 
Online tools were essential for spreading information regarding his political 
program—as the opposition candidate, Navalny was and continues to be barred 
access to mainstream media, in particular federal television—and to recruit 
campaign volunteers (Gambarato and Medvedev, 2015). These volunteers, in 
turn, campaigned both on- and offline, while social media played an important 
facilitating role in attracting people to these offline events. While Sergey 
Sobyanin won the elections in the first round by garnering some 51 percent of 
the votes, Navalny’s 27 per cent showed the success of the campaigning strate-
gies employed. Navalny’s 2018 presidential campaign, which built upon the 
momentum generated following the anti-corruption protests discussed earlier, 
optimized many of these strategies, incorporating sophisticated big data analy-
sis techniques. At the same time, it invested heavily in the creation of a network 
of local headquarters and volunteer groups. Navalny’s campaign activities 
therefore show the continued mutual interdependence of online and offline 
campaigning, and the need to coordinate between and integrate both 
approaches. Contrary to the mayoral elections, the success of Navalny’s presi-
dential campaign cannot be substantiated by election results: in December 
2017, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation decided 
Navalny was not eligible to run for president because of his previous conviction 
in a (much contested) fraud case.5
Notwithstanding the novel opportunities for political opposition, mobiliza-
tion and campaigning provided by digital technologies, it remains difficult for 
those acting outside of the political establishment to be elected to a post of 
political importance or to otherwise effectuate significant political change. 
Gunitsky (2015) furthermore argues that the co-optation of social media by 
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authoritarian regimes in fact serves as a way out of the limitations contained in 
the “dictator’s dilemma” that was introduced above. Social media co-optation, 
he argues, can serve the resilience of authoritarian regimes by enabling, among 
other things, the introduction of alternative frames—for example, counter to 
those formulated by opposition groups—to shape public discourse online.
2.5  votInG
The digitalization of various aspects of the voting process was made possible by 
the adoption of the law “O gosudarstvennoj avtomatizirovannoj sisteme 
Rossijskoj Federacii ‘Vybory’” (On the State Automated System of the Russian 
Federation [called] ‘Elections’, no. 20-FZ, 20 January 2003). “Electronic 
urns,” that is, ballot boxes equipped with a special lid that scans the ballot 
paper when it is entered, counts the votes that have been cast and prints out the 
results, were first introduced in 2004 (kompleks obrabotki izbiratel’nyh bûl-
letenej, referred to in Russian by the abbreviation KOIB). The systems were 
introduced with the stated aim to prevent miscalculations and speed up the 
voting process, while also preventing ballot box stuffing since only one paper 
can be passed through the scanner at a time. E-voting machines (kompleks dlâ 
èlektronnogo golosovaniâ, or KEG) were introduced on a small scale during the 
2007 elections, after having been successfully tested in 2006 in an election in 
Veliky Novgorod. By 2018, most Russian federal districts used KOIB and/or 
KEG systems, albeit on greatly diverging scales; in total 11.1% of votes were 
counted automatically (RIA 2018).
Russia only recently trialed remote electronic voting, and on a modest scale: 
during the 2019 Moscow City Duma elections the voters of three electoral 
districts were given the option to vote online. The experiment did not run 
flawlessly. Already during the preparatory phase, the security of the system was 
questioned; moreover, the fact that it was run by the city of Moscow and vot-
ers’ identity and right to vote were verified by the Moscow Mayor’s portal, 
rather than the Multifunctional Centers for Governmental and Municipal 
Services normally endowed with this task, was criticized (Vasil’chuk 2019). In 
May 2019, the Communist Party filed a case with the Supreme Court in an 
attempt to prohibit the use of online voting in the Moscow elections, citing 
concerns about the violation of voting secrecy and the risk of manipulation and 
coercion of voters (Garmonenko 2019); the Supreme Court found the experi-
ment not to be in violation of the Constitution. On the day of voting, September 
8, 2019, the online voting system experienced multiple interruptions, which 
caused the service to be offline for periods of up to one hour (Kommersant 2019).
In the three districts where it was introduced, online voting appears to have 
worked in favor of pro-regime candidates who received a higher percentage of 
the online votes as compared to the paper votes, while the opposite was the 
case for opposition candidates (Uspenskiy 2019). In one of the districts that 
participated in the trial, the independent candidate would have won on the 
basis of paper votes only, yet lost the election by a mere 84 votes with the 
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addition of votes cast online (Vasil’chuk 2019). The explanation for the fact 
that pro-regime candidates fared comparatively well among those voters who 
voted online has yet to be determined. One thinkable scenario is that the intro-
duction of online voting, and thereby the removal of the controlled conditions 
of the polling station that aim to ensure voter secrecy and freedom of choice, 
makes, for example, civil servants even more vulnerable to coercion. While it 
commonly understood state employees are placed under pressure to vote (to 
increase voter turnout) and support a given candidate, online voting creates 
the opportunity for superiors to directly supervise how their employees vote 
(e.g. by having them vote at the workplace). Whether and to what extent this 
is indeed the case, and to what extent other factors may be able to explain this 
difference, requires further investigation. Moreover, to be able to draw defini-
tive conclusions on how the introduction of online voting may affect political 
outcomes, the empirical base needs to be extended as further trials with online 
voting are conducted.
Apart from the automation of voting and the gradual introduction of voting 
machines, the conditions under which Russians vote has changed through the 
placement of webcams. In response to (proven) accusations of electoral fraud 
committed during the December 2011 parliamentary elections, that gave cause 
to a series of mass protests, the government installed webcams at nearly all poll-
ing stations for the 2012 presidential elections to allow for real-time monitor-
ing via a special website (webvybory2012.ru). In total, 91,000 of the 95,000 
polling stations had a total of 180,000 cameras installed; of these, 80,000 were 
streamed online and with sound (Asmolov 2014). Webcams had been in use 
earlier, but only on a small scale. According to Gregory Asmolov, the actual 
impact of this massive infrastructural investment on increasing the transparency 
and, in particular, the accountability of the voting process was limited by the 
lack of an integrated mechanism for reporting fraudulent behavior, the impos-
sibility of recording live-streamed footage (requiring one to file an official 
request to gain access to centrally stored footage from the webcams) and the 
ill-defined legal status of the recordings. As a result, no “criminal conviction of 
electoral fraud or revision of election results” were made on the basis of the 
videos (Asmolov 2014). Moreover, for volunteer monitors, the sheer number 
of available live streams made it difficult to monitor effectively. Beyond polling 
stations, webcams had earlier been used on smaller scale to monitor the prog-
ress on national projects in 2007, and in 2010 to monitor the reconstruction 
process following the wildfires. According to Asmolov, however, these initia-
tives symbolized rather than truly increased government transparency and 
accountability, as was their supposed aim (Asmolov 2014).
The 2012 presidential elections also saw the first use of a specially developed 
app for election observers called Web-nablûdatel’ (web-observer) (Ermoshina 
2016). The app, developed with the involvement of NGO (non-governmental 
organization) Golos (Voice), provided observers with guidance on how to con-
duct their activities, as well as giving them the ability to report any violations. 
The app was connected to a website hosting a collaborative map and statistics, 
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which provided novel insight into the extent and distribution of suspect and 
fraudulent behaviors. The aggregation of information, as well as the support 
the app provided for individuals volunteering to act as election observers, are 
important for consolidating proper election observation practices and enabling 
follow-up political actions.
In addition to the government, opposition forces have also turned to online 
voting as a means for creating legitimacy. As the 2011–2012 protest movement 
sought to transition from street protests into a sustained political opposition 
movement, an online vote was organized to elect the Koordinacionnyj sovet ros-
sijskoj oppozicii (Coordination Council of the Opposition) (Toepfl 2017). It 
was believed that this strategy would help remedy the lack of internal coher-
ence and coordination (and as a result, credibility and legitimacy) that has 
undermined the success of earlier protests and opposition movements. The 
council was short lived, however, as the legitimacy provided by the voting pro-
cess proved insufficient to remedy the fault lines within the opposition it sought 
to unite and was dissolved in 2013.
2.6  cIvIc tech and cIvIc enGaGement
In addition to the changes described above, digitalization has enabled new 
forms of political participation, among others, through the introduction of 
online consultation platforms. Florian Toepfl (2018, 960) proposes to catego-
rize such digital participatory tools into four groups: tools that allow citizens 
to monitor policy implementation; tools enabling the public discussion of poli-
cies, measures or draft laws; tools that collect citizen preferences; and, forms of 
Internet voting outside of the electoral system. Above, we have already come 
across examples of the first—webcams used to monitor the progress of national 
projects—and second groups—the regulation.gov.ru portal for the public dis-
cussion of draft laws. The third group Toepfl identifies comprises tools that 
collect citizen preferences and thereby allow the government to “gauge the 
intensity of support for, or resistance to, planned measures or policy changes” 
(Toepfl 2018, 960). For example, the Rossijskaâ obsêstvennaâ iniciativa 
(Russian public initiative) portal (roi.ru) that was introduced in 2013 allows 
citizens to submit an initiative to the government and cast their vote for pro-
posals posted by others. If the initiative receives a sufficient number of votes, it 
will be discussed by expert working groups of the relevant federal, regional or 
municipal authorities (at least 100,000 signatures for proposals at the federal 
level or in regions with a population of over two million; or over five percent 
of the registered population for proposals aimed at regional and municipal 
governments). According to data published by the portal on the occasion of its 
sixth anniversary in April 2019, a total of 50,531 initiatives were submitted 
since its introduction, that received 17,970,021 votes in favor and 2,615,479 
against (Rossijskaâ obsêstvennaâ iniciativa 2019). The number of initiatives 
that led to government action, however, is limited: 33 initiatives resulted in a 
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decision, while 19 proposals succeeded in gathering over 100,000 votes in 
support.
The final group outlined by Toepfl concerns forms of Internet voting out-
side of the electoral system. The Active Citizen Platform of the city of Moscow, 
for example, allows inhabitants to decide on questions put before them by the 
city council; from naming metro stations and trains to school vacation dates. 
Citizen budgets—where online platforms are used as a tool for increasing bud-
getary transparency or to facilitate participatory budgeting, in which citizens 
have a say in the spending of state resources—are another example of this cat-
egory. The city of Yakutsk, for instance, provides extensive insight into its 
sources of income and spending, while providing core information concerning 
the budgetary process (openbudget.yakadm.ru). While, in the case of such citi-
zen budget portals, opportunities for citizen participation are limited, partici-
patory budgeting initiatives are more ambitious. In 2016 the city of St. 
Petersburg, for example, launched the Tvoj Bûdžet project (Your Budget, tvoy-
budget.spb.ru) in collaboration with the European University of St. Petersburg. 
Through its online portal, citizens can propose how resources should be spent 
in their neighborhood. Based on the total number of submitted proposals, a 
small number of districts (both inner city and suburbs) is then selected and 
allocated an earmarked budget of up to 15 million rubles for the realization of 
between one and three initiatives. In a special meeting, a budget committee is 
formed from among the initiators (by draw). The members of the committee 
then take part in a series of lectures to learn about, for example, urban planning 
and budgeting, in order to further develop their ideas. The final plans need to 
secure support from the district administration and be voted upon by the 
members of the budgeting committee in order to receive funding (Antonov 
2018). One of the most visible citizen initiatives realized through Your Budget 
is a stretch of cycling lanes along one of the city’s central canals.
Analyzing another example of the last category—the online voting to elect 
members for the President’s Council on the Development of Civil Society and 
Human Rights in 2012—Toepfl argues such tools serve to strengthen, rather 
than weaken authoritarian rule, while simultaneously “convey[ing] to the mass 
public the image of transparent, accountable, and responsive government” 
(Toepfl 2018, 958). Studies of the use of online participatory tools by auto-
cratic regimes elsewhere indicate that we, indeed, should not expect too much 
of a democratizing effect from civic tech. In China, for example, the authorities 
do appear to incorporate citizen input received through online consultation 
platforms, where a higher number of comments demanding a revision is found 
to increase the likelihood of the policy being revised (Kornreich 2019). In a 
similar vein, Jiang et al. (2019, 532) find that “cities that receive a larger num-
ber of online petitions in a year tend to devote significantly higher proportions 
of government reports in the following year to a topic on social welfare,” which 
reflects the majority of concerns expressed in the petitions. Yet, this type of citi-
zen influence remains limited, at best, and does not necessarily translate into 
sustained political change or the upscaling of political participation to other/
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higher levels of politics. As Yoel Kornreich explains, a certain degree of “author-
itarian responsiveness” is to be expected since “[f]ailure to address citizen feed-
back will undermine the regime’s credibility,” while simultaneously undermining 
“citizens’ motivation to participate in consultation, thus depriving the authori-
ties of an important information gathering channel” (Kornreich 2019, 549). 
Since legitimacy and information gathering are the main incentives for imple-
menting civic tech, minimal functionality and effectiveness are insufficient indi-
cators of democratization.
Whereas Toepfl’s categorization captures the governmental side of civic 
tech, digitalization has also enabled novel forms of civic engagement. On the 
local and regional levels, in particular, manifold civic initiatives (portals) have 
been successfully launched aimed at e-participation (e.g., urban improvement), 
at times acting in direct competition with government-initiated e-participation 
portals. Analyzing such “civic apps” in Russia, Ksenia Ermoshina argues that, 
while “a civic application can become a means to overcome the existing dys-
functions in communication between citizens and official institutions,” they 
are still best suited to solving “problems that can be easily classified and are 
regulated by a definite legal basis” (Ermoshina 2016, 128, 137). Successful 
examples include RosYama (Russian pit), an app developed by Alexei Navalny’s 
Anti-Corruption Foundation to map and draw attention to potholes in Russian 
roads or RosZKH (Russian housing and communal services) that “help[ed] 
individuals write petitions to the Housing Inspection Committees responsible 
for oversight of their particular block of flats” (Ermoshina 2014).
The two types—civic tech and civic apps—are not always perfectly sepa-
rated, nor do civic apps always empower citizens vis-à-vis the state. In his study 
of emergency response volunteering platforms, Gregory Asmolov demon-
strates the different shapes the power relations between authorities and/or 
platform administrators and volunteers can take. Rather than enabling more 
horizontal, peer-to-peer forms of (self-)organization, the way platforms for 
citizen engagement operate risk taking on the characteristics of “vertical crowd-
sourcing,” in which,
the structure of activity is defined by the institutional actor, with no space for the 
influence of agency on the system’s structure. In this case the purpose of the 
system, the boundaries, the rules, the right to participate in the community, and 
the division of labor are dictated by the agent who created the platform. In many 
cases the purpose of this type of activity system is primarily to control the activity 
of the crowd and to neutralize the potential for independent forms of activity. 
(Asmolov 2015, 311)
Instead of empowering citizens in their capacity to address societal issues, 
vertical crowdsourcing of resources impedes action independent of state or 





In this chapter, I have examined the impact of digitalization on Russian poli-
tics, covering the spheres of political communication, campaigning, voting, 
civic tech and civic engagement. From blogging politicians to online political 
campaigning, open government data and participatory budgeting—digital 
technologies evidently are shaping how politics is conducted in Russia and who 
can participate in and influence political decision-making. Some of the changes 
and initiatives I have examined are best categorized as digital replications of 
existing political practices or have only limited impact on political practices. 
The introduction of voting computers, for example, is a slow process that, thus 
far, does not appear to affect election outcomes. Most online participatory 
tools lack bite. Yet, it appears that several spheres of Russian politics have 
indeed been transformed as a result of digitalization. This concerns, in particu-
lar, the novel opportunities that have emerged for conducting and organizing 
political opposition, including political campaigning by opposition candidates, 
and civic engagement. At the same time, these transformations do not neces-
sarily result in the strengthening of the democratic degree of political practices. 
Rather, the cases and studies reviewed in this chapter support the claim that in 
many cases digital tools for political participation serve to strengthen, rather 
than weaken, state control.
notes
1. According to police estimates, some 7000 persons took part in the Moscow pro-
test and 5000  in St. Petersburg. Several hundreds of protesters were arrested, 
including Navalny.
2. For an overview of campaign characteristics from 1993–2016, see Ishiyama (2019).
3. On election campaigning and changes in political advertisement, including the 
use of compromising materials (kompromat) in the period 1993–2014, see 
Samoilenko and Erzikova (2017).
4. Gambarato and Medvedev (2015, 176) identify a total of 32 different elements 
to the campaign, ranging from political advertisements, banners and stickers to 
distributing campaign materials on public transport and an online couch surfing 
service for volunteers.
5. Unlike Navalny, former socialite Ksenia Sobchak did succeed in being registered 
as a candidate and ran an oppositional campaign with the motto “Sobchak against 
all.” Boasting a massive following on Instagram, social media were at the center 
of her campaign. Contrary to Navalny, though, Sobchak did receive coverage on 
federal television and participated in the televised debates of presidential candi-
dates (president Putin was conspicuous by his absence).
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